With the Ukrainian army gradually falling into passivity on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, the huge counter-offensive has long since come to an end, and may not make any substantive progress. The Russian army has resumed its offensive on various fronts, and a number of strategic locations held by the Ukrainian army have been endangered.
At the same time, things are not looking good for Ukraine off the battlefield, with Western aid falling short while Russia's domestic war machine is revving up, casting a shadow over Ukraine's prospects for continuing the war. NATO already seems to be planning ahead, considering how to respond to the Russian military threat after the war with Ukraine is over (assuming, of course, that Ukraine is defeated). An assessment by the German Foreign Policy Institute (DGAP) clearly states that NATO has six to 10 years to prepare for war with Russia.
It sounds fanciful. After all, when the Russian-Ukrainian war will end is still unknown. Isn't it too early to predict the next war? In fact, the problem is not so simple, although NATO is not a direct participant in the war between Russia and Ukraine, but the war has been fought for nearly two years, and various experiences and lessons have not only overturned many of the inherent cognition of everyone in the past, but also made NATO feel a clear sense of crisis.
Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, public opinion generally believed that: on the one hand, Russia inherited the military heritage of the Soviet Union, can be regarded as the second military power in the world, and has a wealth of actual combat experience, and quickly beat the poor and weak Ukraine that is no problem. On the other hand, NATO, led by the United States, is far more powerful than Russia economically, militarily, and technologically. As long as NATO intervenes decisively, such as making a 21st century version of the Lend-lease bill, vigorously aiding Ukraine, and imposing sanctions on Russia, Russia will soon be defeated.
But what about the results of the practice of war? Russia does not have the ability to bring Ukraine to a quick end, and NATO's intervention does not have the ability to produce an immediate and effective response, and they are locked in a marathon race of war will and war potential. At this time, people suddenly discovered that NATO's paper strength advantage over Russia does not work well in a real war of attrition. NATO's GDP is more than $40 trillion, Russia's GDP is just over $2 trillion, at first glance, the two sides are completely different players of the same order of magnitude. However, Ukraine has almost exhausted the ammunition stocks of NATO countries, and it is very difficult to produce supplementary ammunition, taking 155mm shells as an example, the United States can barely reach the level of 100,000 rounds per month until 2026, and the current monthly production is only more than 30,000.European countries are more pull the croin, the war has so far emptied out only more than 300,000 shells, a mention of expansion simply lie flat. Russia produces more than 1 million 152mm shells a month and is expanding production much faster than NATO countries.
